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Abstract. The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational
details presents a di¢ culty in applying it to games which are not fully speci￿ed.
Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. More-
over, they arrise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-
anonymous players.
The paper describes this condition and its implications.
1. Introduction
Deciding whether to attend WINE 2005 is a participation game, where players￿
payo⁄s depend on the participation choices of others. But like many other games,
it is only partially speci￿ed. It is known that players may go to a web site and
click in their choice before some deadline, but it is not known in what order they
will move, what information they will have, who may make agreements with whom,
etc., etc.
Equilibrium analysis of a partially-speci￿ed game forces the analyst to make-up
all the missing details. But since equilibrium predictions are often sensitive to such
details, the analyst￿ s predictions are often unreliable.
1
Equilibria that are structurally robust, as described in this paper, are less
sensitive to many game speci￿cs.
2 As such, they o⁄er a partial resolution to the
di¢ culty above. The analyst can compute the equilibrium of a game with a minimal
structure (simultaneous-one-move play), and be assured that it remains equilibrium
no matter what the missing details are.
Structural robustness is a strong property that fails in the equilibria of most
games. But as discussed in this paper, in games with many semi-anonymous players
all the equilibria are structurally robust.
3
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This is a Key Note Lecture to be presented in the ￿rst World Workshop on Internet and
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1This high level of sensitivity is well known to researchers and users of game theory. Even
small modi￿cations, such as allowing the players to make meaningless cheap-talk announcements,
may drastically alter the equilibrium of the game, see for example Crawford and Sobel (1982).
2Other notions of robustness and structural robustness were proposed in economics. We
refer the reader to Hansen and Sargent (2001) for some examples. An earlier weaker notion of
structural stability was introduced in Kalai (2004) under the name of extensive robustness.
3Positive results about large games were obtained earlier in the cooperative-games literature,
see Aumann and Shapley (1974) for a survey.
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In addition to dealing with partially speci￿ed games, structural robustness has
other important implications, even in fully speci￿ed games. For better or worse,
an equilibrium with this property is more persistent, it self-puri￿es, has a strong
ex-post Nash property, can be used to model a small-world game embedded in a
larger game, and has a strong rational-expectations property in market games.
2. De￿nition of Structural Robustness
Starting with an n-person simultaneous-one-move game, we ￿rst describe a large
number of variations on how the game may be played. Such variations allow for
sequential (instead of simultaneous) moves, multiple opportunities to revise earlier
choices, information transmission, commitments, delegations, etc. The eventual
purpose is to identify equilibrium as being structurally robust, if it survives under
all such variations.
2.1. Metagames. To describe a variation of the simultaneous move game, G,
we introduce the notion of a metagame of G. The concept is natural and straight
forward but the formal notations are cumbersome.
4 For this reason, it is better to
explain it through a couple of simple examples.
Consider ￿rst a 2-person Match Pennies game (MP for short) with player 1
being a male who wishes to match his opponent, and player 2 being a female who
wishes to mismatch her opponent.
5 The play of the game has the four possible H-
P pairs, (H,H), (H,T), (T,H), (T,T), with the corresponding payo⁄s, (1,-1), (-1,1),
(-1,1), (1,-1). A metagame of MP is any m-person perfect-recall extensive game
M that has exactly one of the four H-P pairs above associated with every one of
its ￿nal nodes. In other words, every play of M yields a play of MP.
Condition 1. Preservation of strategies and payo⁄s: We restrict our-
selves to metagames that satisfy three properties. First, the players of the metagame
include all the original players of the underlying game MP.
Second, any of the original MP players has metagame strategies that guarantee
him, in the metagame, the same pure choices that he has in MP. For example, since
player 1 can choose H in MP, he should have a metagame strategy that guarantees
him (no matter what strategies are used by the opponents) to end up (with probability
one) at a ￿nal node in which his label is H (the associate pair being (H,H) or (H,T)).
Third, the metagame must preserve the original payo⁄s in the sense that at
every ￿nal node of M, the payo⁄s of the original players are the same as their
payo⁄s in MP. For example, if the metagame ends at a ￿nal node with the associate
pair (H,H) then the payo⁄s of players 1 and 2 are (1,-1).
Three simple examples of metagames of MP that preserve strategies and payo⁄s
are the following.
Example 1. Sequential-play metagame: player 1 moves ￿rst and chooses
H or T, player 2 moves second and chooses H or T after being informed of the choice
of player 1. The associated pair at a ￿nal node consists of the pair of sequential
choices made on the path leading to it, and the payo⁄s are the MP payo⁄s de￿ned
at this pair.
4As is the case for most formal models that involve extensive form games.
5Simultaneously, each one of them chooses either H or T. If the choices match, she pays him
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Example 2. Metagame with revisions: simultaneously each of the two
players chooses H or T; then, after being informed of the pair of choices, simulta-
neously they each choose H or T again. The associated pair at every ￿nal node of
the metagame consists of the choices made in the second round, and the payo⁄s are
the MP payo⁄s de￿ned at this pair.
Example 3. Metagame with an outsider setting the rules: player 3, the
rule setter, moves ￿rst and decides whether the game will be played simultaneously,
sequentially, or simultaneously with revisions. After being informed of his choice,
the original players play according to the rule chosen by him and receive the ap-
propriate payo⁄s. The metagame preserves strategies and payo⁄s, no matter what
payo⁄s are assigned to the outsider (the rule setter) at the ￿nal nodes.
As the reader should be able to see, one can construct a large number of inter-
esting metagames that preserves strategies and payo⁄s.
2.2. Metaversions of strategies. To require that an equilibrium ￿ survive in
all metagames,￿we ￿rst must clarify how a strategy of the simultaneous move game
is played in a given metagame. This can be done easily due to the requirement
that the metagame preserve strategies.
For example, consider the .50-.50 H-T mixed strategy of player 1 (he chooses H
or T with equal probability in MP) and consider the metagame with a rule setter.
Let  1 be the metagame mixed strategy in which player 1 chooses with equal
probabilities one of the following two pure strategies: (1) he chooses H in every
one of his information sets in the metagame, or (2) he chooses T in every one of
his information sets in the metagame. This strategy guarantees that he ends up
with an H (with probability .50) or guarantees that he ends up with a T (with
probability .50).6
When such is the case we say that  1 is a metaversion of the .50-.50 H-T mixed
strategy. However, there are additional metaversions of the .50-.50 H-T mixed
strategy. For example, player 1 may mix over the following two pure metagame
strategies: (1) he chooses H in every one of his metagame information sets, or (2)
he chooses T in every one of his metagame information sets except for the ￿rst
round of the subgame with revisions where he chooses H.
Having de￿ned metaversions of individual strategies, we can de￿ne metaversions
of strategy pro￿les. For example, the strategy pro￿le ( 1; 2; 3) in the metagame
with a ruler is a metaversion of the strategy pro￿le (￿1;￿2) in MP, if  1 is a
metaversion of ￿1 and  2 is a metaversion of ￿2 (outsiders￿ strategies are not
restricted).
2.3. Structural robustness. An equilibrium ￿ of the simultaneous move
game is structurally robust, if it is an equilibrium in every metagame that preserves
strategies and payo⁄s. This means that no matter what metagame is played, in
every metaversion of ￿ the strategies of the original players are best response.
6This is stronger than simply guaranteeing a .50-.50 outcome on H or T. For example, consider
a metagame that starts with nature moving left or right with equal probabilities, and players 1
and 2 follow with a simultaneous choice of H or T after observing nature￿ s choice. To choose
H after nature moves left and T after nature moves right is a strategy that guarantees player 1
.50-.50 probabilities over a ￿nal label of H or T. But this strategy cannot be decomposed into a
.50-.50 lottery over one strategy that guarantees him H and one strategy that guarantees him T.4 EHUD KALAI
For example, for an equilibrium ￿ = (￿1;￿2) of MP to be structurally robust,
the metaversions of ￿ must be optimal in every metagame of MP. If in the metagame
with a ruler, for example,   = ( 1; 2; 3) is a metaversion of ￿, then  1 and  2
must be a best response strategies of player 1 and player 2 respectively ( 3 is not
restricted).
We may think of ￿ as being a uniform Nash equilibrium in every metagame,
since any metaversions of (￿1;￿2) are optimal no matter what the strategies of the
outsiders are.7
It is easy to see that MP has no structurally robust equilibrium. Since the
underlying game is always a metagame of itself, any structurally robust equilibrium
must be equilibrium of the underlying game itself. Thus the only candidate for
structural robustness in MP is the pro￿le consisting of the pair of .50-.50 H-T mixed
strategies. But this pair fails to be an equilibrium in the sequential play metagame
for example. Randomly choosing H or T is no longer a best reply of the follower
since she is better o⁄ mismatching player 1￿ s observed choice.
2.4. Approximate structural robustness. The existence di¢ culty becomes
less sever when the number of players is large. Consider a generalized Match Pen-
nies game that consists of n males and n females, 2nMP. Simultaneously, they each
choose H or T. A male￿ s payo⁄ is the proportion of females his choice matches
and a female￿ s payo⁄s is the proportion of males she mismatches. The .50-.50 H-T
pro￿le of mixed strategies is an equilibrium that turns out to be highly structurally
robust when n is large. In the sequential-play metagame with all the males moving
￿rst, for example, when the females turn to choose comes up, the distribution of
male choices will be nearly one half H￿ s and one half T￿ s with probability close to
one. Thus randomly choosing between H and T is nearly optimal for every female.
(Using Cherno⁄ bounds, for any " > 0 the probability that the proportion of H-
choosing males be outside the :50 ￿ " range goes down to zero at an exponential
rate in the number of males).
The above observation motivates an approximate de￿nition of being (";￿) struc-
turally robust. For a given pair of such non negative numbers we require that the
equilibrium of the simultaneous move game be (";￿) Nash equilibrium in every
metagame that preserves strategies and payo⁄s. Being (";￿) Nash equilibrium
means that the event ￿ following a play path along which some player can improve
his payo⁄ at some information set by more than "￿has probability of at most ￿.8
2.5. Generalization to Bayesian games. Due to their wide applicability,
it is important to generalize the above notions to simultaneous-one-move Bayesian
games.9 The generalizations are straight forward, as illustrated by the following
example of an n-person Bayesian MP game (BMP for short).
Every player i is randomly drawn to be a male or a female type according
to commonly known individual prior probabilities. Before they make any choices,
everyone is informed (only) of his own realized type. Next, simultaneously, each
of the n players chooses H or T. Every player￿ s payo⁄ is a function of his type, his
7Using the standard ￿xed point method, for every structurally robust ￿ and every metagame,
every metaversion of ￿ can be completed to a metagame pro￿le in which all the players (including
the outsiders) best respond.
8See Kalai (2004) for elaboration.
9See Harsanyi (1967/68)PARTIAL LARGE GAMES 5
choice, and the distribution of types and choices of his opponents. For example,
a male￿ s (type) payo⁄ may be the proportion of females (female types) his choice
matches and afemale￿ s payo⁄ may be the proportion of males she mismatches.
A metagame of BMP is again any m-person perfect recall extensive form game
with an n-tuple of H-T￿ s associated with each of its ￿nal nodes. But to be com-
patible with the underlying Bayesian game, it must start with a move of nature,
where the types of the individual players are drawn with the same distribution as
in BMP, and with every player being informed of his own realized type prior to the
start of play.
An equilibrium of BMP is (";￿) structurally robust if it remains an (";￿) Nash
equilibrium in every metagame of BMP that preserves strategies and payo⁄s.
3. Main result
To keep the presentation simple, we restrict ourselves to games in which player
types are restricted to be called male or female and player actions are restricted to
be called H or T. These particular names of types and actions are not important,
nor is the fact that there are only two types and two actions. It is important
however, that there is a ￿nite number of each.
Consider a family of games F that includes for every n = 1;2;::: many n person
games (could even be uncountably many games for every n). Every n-person game
Gn 2 F is described by a collection of n pairs Gn = (￿i;ui)n
i=1 having the following
interpretation. The non negative number ￿i is the probability that player i is a
male type (male for short) and 1 ￿ ￿i is the probability that player i is a female
type (female for short). It is assumed that types are drawn independently across
players.
The payo⁄ function of every player i, ui, is anonymous in the sense that
it may depend only on aggregate data of player i￿ s opponents. More formally
ui : (ti;ai;e￿i) 7￿! r 2 [0;1], where ti = male or female, ai = H or T, and
e￿i = (em;H;em;T;ef;H;ef;T) describes the proportions of opponents type-choice
combinations. For example em;H describes the proportion of player i￿ s opponents
who are males who choose H.
We assume also that the collection of all payo⁄ functions (consisting of all the
functions ui￿ s from all the games in F) is uniformly equicontinuous.
Theorem 1. Structural Robustness. Given the family F above and an
" > 0, there are positive constants ￿ and ￿, ￿ < 1, such that for every n person
game in the family all the equilibria are (";￿￿
n) structurally robust.
This theorem is a generalization of a theorem in Kalai (2004). Even though
the result is substantially stronger, the proof is similar and is therefore omitted (it
requires that the number of player types and possible actions be uniformly bounded
by ￿nite numbers. This could possibly be replaced by assumptions of continuity
and compactness).
3.1. Some clari￿cations. The anonymity imposed on the individual payo⁄
functions is far from being full anonymity, since players may have individual pay-
o⁄ functions and individual prior distributions over types. While this already
means that the players are not anonymous individuals, it even breaks some of the
anonymity in the payo⁄ functions.6 EHUD KALAI
For example, we may have a formulation that includes a type whose name
is Mr:Jones, and in a certain game only player 1 is the Mr:Jones type (he has
prior probability one of being so and every other player has probability zero of
being so). Now, while the players payo⁄s are anonymous in the technical sense
formulated above, the payo⁄s of the players may depend on the action of player 1
in a non symmetric way. For example player 2 payo⁄ may depend entirely on the
distribution of actions chosen by MrJones types, thus making player 2 payo⁄ be a
function of player 1￿ s action. This method of breaking anonymity is only partial,
however, since we can accommodate only ￿nitely many types and the number of
players becomes in￿nite.
Another consequence of the individualized payo⁄functions and prior probabili-
ties is that the family of games above may contain many games that are drastically
di⁄erent from the Match Pennies game that we started with. For example, it may
contain two players, both female type with probability one, and each has a pay-
o⁄ function that is one if and only if she matches the opponent. This is a pure
coordination game.
The Bayesian aspect of the formulation allows for interesting games. For
example player 1 may be a female who wishes to match, but player 2 may have a
positive prior operability of being a male who wishes to mismatch and a positive
prior probability of being a female who wishes to match. Thus, player 1 may not
know exactly whether he is in a coordination game or a match pennies game.
In a similar way, the family may contain prisoners￿dilemma games of various
sizes. When we allow n types, all n person payo⁄ functions can be accommodated.
4. Implications
4.1. Partially speci￿ed games. In what sense does the above theorem help
the modeling of a partially speci￿ed game? The analyst may write such a game
with a minimal structure, as a simultaneous one-move game, and compute its equi-
librium. This equilibrium will survive even if the structure is made richer.
For example, in a large anonymous participation game, where the choice of
every player is whether or not to participate in an event, the analyst may write the
game where simultaneously every player decide whether to participate or not, and
compute its equilibrium. The structural robustness theorem implies that this equi-
librium will be sustained no matter how the simultaneous move and informational
assumptions are changed. So even if choices are made sequentially, private and
public messages being transmitted according to any dynamic stochastic process,
players are allowed to repeatedly revise earlier choices, players are allowed to inter-
act and make use of outsiders, under all such possibilities the computed equilibrium
is not destroyed.
However, the resolution is only partial. While all the equilibria of the simultaneous-
one-move game are sustained in all extensive metagames, each metagame may have
additional equilibria that are not present in the simultaneous one-move game. This
puts us into another typical di¢ culty of game theory, namely multiplicity of equi-
libria. Whether one equilibrium will be sustained over others depends on focal
point and related considerations.
The simultaneous-one-move equilibria have an added advantage over the others:
they are the only equilibria present in the intersection of all metagames, since the
simultaneous one-move game is one of the metagames of itself.PARTIAL LARGE GAMES 7
4.2. Ex-post stability. The structural robustness property implies other game
theoretic properties of the equilibrium. One important consequence is strong ex-
post stability (also known as ex-post Nash).10 This means that after the game is
over, even with (full or partial) hind-sight information about the types and choices
of the others, no player has incentive to change (or regrets) the choice he made.
A vector of types and actions is " ex-post Nash if for every player and for
every outcome of the game, even with perfect hind-sight information about the
realized types and selected actions of all his opponents, the player cannot gain an
"-improvement in his payo⁄ by a unilateral change of his own action.
An equilibrium is (";￿) ex-post Nash if the probability of ending up with a
vector of types and actions which is " ex-post Nash is at least 1 ￿ ￿.
To see that (";￿) structural robustness implies (";￿) ex-post Nash consider
the metagame with revision discussed earlier (they play the one shot game once,
observe everybody￿ s realized types and choices, and get to revise their choices in a
second round). For any equilibrium of the simultaneous move game, consider the
following metaversion. Play the equilibrium in the ￿rst round, with no revisions in
the second round. The structural robustness property implies that this metaversion
of the equilibrium is an equilibrium of the metagame with revision. This, however,
is equivalent to being ex-post Nash (also in the (";￿) adjusted senses of both).
The ex-post stability is stronger than just described, because it holds even for
partial information. It may be that no player can improve his payo⁄ by more than
" when given complete information about the types and choices of his opponents,
but he can improve his expected payo⁄by more than " when he conditions on partial
information about his opponents. Being strongly (";￿) ex-post Nash means that
this is not the case. No matter what hind-sight (perfect or imperfect) information
is given to individual players, with probability at least 1 ￿ ￿ no one can improve
his expected payo⁄ by more than " by a unilateral change of his selected action.
4.3. Self Puri￿cation. The ex-post Nash property may alternatively be viewed
as a property of self puri￿cation. Starting with Schmeidler (1973), there is a large
literature showing that large anonymous games have pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium. Schmeidler￿ s paper starts by proving the existence of ￿ mixed strategies￿
equilibrium, and then proving that he can purify it, i.e., replace the mixed strate-
gies by pure ones without destroying the equilibrium property.
But when an equilibrium is (fully) ex-post Nash (in the sense de￿ned in this
paper), the pro￿les of pure strategies that can be generated by its play must all
be Nash equilibria of the game. In other words, there is no need to purify the
equilibrium since it puri￿es itself (through laws of large numbers).
And going beyond the puri￿cation literature of Schmeidler (which studies only
simultaneous-move normal-form games), self puri￿cation holds for simultaneous-
move Bayesian games. The play of any Bayesian equilibrium which is ex-post
Nash must generate, for every vector of realized types, a pro￿le of pure actions
which is a Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game determined by the realized
types.
There are some technical di⁄erences between the two approaches. Schmeidler
and follow up papers model large games by assuming a continuum of players, while
the current paper models it asymptotically by letting the number of players grow to
10See Cremer and McLean (1985), Green and La⁄ont (1987) and follow up literatures, for
earlier (weaker) versions of the concept.8 EHUD KALAI
in￿nity. A di¢ culty in Schmeidler￿ s model is that mixed strategy pro￿les are hard
(border line impossible) to de￿ne, since they involves a continuum of independent
mixed strategies. A limitation of the current paper is that the full ex-post Nash
property holds only in the limit. The reader may verify though, that the approxi-
mate notion of (";￿) ex-post Nash gives rise to a natural approximate notion of self
puri￿cation which becomes fully so in the limit.
4.4. Small world in a bigger game. Game theorists model games in iso-
lation, ignoring strategic and informational spillovers between the game and the
outside world in which the game is played. This often leads to incorrect analy-
sis since such spillovers can easily destroy equilibria of the isolated game. It is
therefore important to identify conditions under which an equilibrium persist, even
when embedded in a bigger world.
Since metagames allow additional players, additional actions, back and forth
communication and the like, they provide a model of a bigger world in which the
underlying game may be embedded. Moreover, the condition of structural ro-
bustness is precisely the one that guarantees the survival of the equilibrium under
such embedding. This makes the su¢ cient-conditions for structural robustness
important in the discussion of the embedding issue.
Clearly, the requirement that the metagame preserve strategies and payo⁄s
limits the scope of possible embeddings. But it is important to note that if the
outside world in which the isolated game is played does not preserve its strategies
and payo⁄s, then the isolated game should not be studied in the ￿rst place. It is
simply not the game that exists in reality.
Assuming, therefore, the metagame does preserve strategies and payo⁄s, as a
general rule it still does not preserve the equilibria of the isolated game, unless the
isolated game is large as assumed in our model.
We may conclude that the equilibria of large semi-anonymous games are perse-
vered when embedded in the outside world, provided that the embedding preserve
strategies and payo⁄s. We should keep in mind that while the equilibria are pre-
served, the presence of the outside world may introduce new additional equilibia,
not identi￿ed by the analysis of the isolated game.
4.5. Implementation. Mechanism designers deal with games in which the
natural equilibrium may be ine¢ cient, and aim to create new related games in
which equilibria are e¢ cient. The new game has the same set of possible types
outcomes as the original game, but it is redesigned to have ￿ good incentives.￿ In
the language of the current paper, mechanism designers often replace an underlying
￿ bad game￿by a metagame, and by doing so they implement a better equilibrium.
To a signi￿cant extent the implementation literature studies the possible im-
provements that a mechanism designer may attain under various restrictions on the
possible or permissible implementing metagame. The condition that a metagame
preserves strategies and payo⁄s is interesting in this regard. It means that the
designer cannot invade the options of the participants, by disallowing them some
choices or by modifying the consequences of the original choices.
Under this restriction, the structural robustness property has an interesting im-
plication, since it limits the ability of the mechanism designer to eliminate the bad
equilibrium. This means that he must resort to more subtle means of implementa-
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becomes non appealing. For example, he may be able to construct a metagame in
which the original bad equilibrium involves the use of dominated strategies, or has
some other non appealing aspects from focal point considerations.
The observations above may be important to real-life policy makers and system
designers. Languages, measurement systems, and keyboard choices are examples
illustrating that highly ine¢ cient social equilibria are likely to persist even despite
social attempts to replace them by more e¢ cient ones.
4.6. Rational expectations. When restricting ourselves to market games,
the strong ex-post Nash property of structurally robust equilibrium implies that the
equilibrium has a strong rational expectations property.11 This may be illustrated
by considering a Bayesian version of a Shapley-Shubik game, where players of ran-
dom types (representing possible initial endowments, information and preferences)
submit, in a one-simultaneous-move game, portions of their initial endowments to
be traded in the market. Final market prices are computed as a function of the
submitted quantities and net trades are executed by these ￿nal prices.12
In general, Nash equilibrium of such a game fails to satisfy the rational expec-
tations property economists expect from an equilibrium. This property requires
that every agent￿ s trade be optimal at the market prices, given his individual type
and the inference (bases on the observed prices) he may make about the unknown
types of the others. This cannot be expected to hold for the Shapley-Shubik players
since their strategies are based entirely on knowledge of their individual parame-
ters, without knowledge of the choices made by the others (and the consequential
market prices).
But an equilibrium which is strongly ex-post Nash turns out to automatically
satisfy the rational expectations property. Prices, in the Shapley-Shubik game, are
ex-post information. Thus, under a strong ex-post Nash condition, knowing the
prices gives no player incentives to revise his choices. This means that his trade
is optimal given knowledge of the prices in the same sense requited by rational
expectations.
The intuition is fairly straight forward. When the game has many traders,
with unknown types but known prior distributions over types, laws of large numbers
allow the traders to correctly anticipate the ￿nal market prices which depends on
aggregated data of the opponents. Therefore the ex-post Nash property and the
rational expectation property both hold.13
The fact that the ex-post Nash property is strong implies a strong rational
expectations property. The trade every player ends up with is optimal given his
information, any inference he may make through the realized prices, but also any
inference he may make from any other information he may acquire.
11For examples of economic and game theoretic implications see Lucas (1972), Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), Jordan and Radner (1982) and Forge and Minelli (1998).
12See Shapley and Shubik (1977) and Peck (2003)
13The above arguments require continuity of the payo⁄ functions under small changes in
the distribution of opponent characteristics. This is so because in the game above players are
small in thier strategic in￿uence and in the information they posses (see for example McLean and
Postlewaite (2002)). When individual players posses substantial inside information, continuity
fails and we do not obtain the required ex-post Nash and the consequential rational expectations
properties.10 EHUD KALAI
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